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Notes and Comments
PROPERTY: RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: EQUITABLE SERVITUDES AND
CHANGING CONDITIONS.
How much reliance can a residential property owner place on the fact
that the tract in which his property is located is protected by restrictive
covenants? This question is pertinent due to the constant influx of people
into California and the subsequent need for commercial outlets and
multiple dwellings. The courts have approached this problem with dili-
gence but without any degree of uniformity. Reasons given for this lack
of uniformity have been, first, that many facts and circumstances col-
lectively determine whether a restrictive covenant will be denied enforce-
ment; and, second, that decisions in this area are largely in the discretion
of the trial court.
The major area of disagreement resolves around the question of what
change of conditions will be sufficient to justify a court in refusing to
enforce a restrictive covenant. A further question posed by the problem
is whether it is necessary that the change be limited to the particular tract
in question, or whether enforcement of a restrictive covenant can be
denied where all of the changes have occurred outside the tract.
One of the earliest cases on the subject is Miles v. Clark.1 In that
case the trial court enjoined the defendants from violating their own
servitude by selling lots in the tract for hotel and apartment uses. Appeal-
ing to the District Court of Appeal, the defendants urged as ground
for reversal that the character of the property in the surrounding neigh-
borhood had so changed since the time the restrictions were imposed that
enforcement would now be inequitable. They also contended that many
apartments and hotels in the surrounding area made the unrestricted land
worth five times the value of the restricted property. The court recognized
the general rule that a change in conditions is a sufficient ground for
refusing to enforce a servitude, but denied relief in this case because
there was no evidence of a radical change. The mere fact that the land
was more valuable for business purposes was immaterial.
This case has been urged to support the proposition that before a
restrictive covenant will be denied enforcement it must be shown that
the character of the restricted region as a whole has substantially changed
so as to render it unadaptable to the restrictions originally imposed. 2
It has also been cited as holding that this change must come from or
be within the entire restricted area.3
The majority opinion in Downs v. Kroeger,4 on the other hand, held
1 44 Cal.App. 539, 187 Pac. 167 (1919).
2 Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927). See dissenting opinion.
s Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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that changed conditions may occur outside the tract and still be effective
to render unenforceable a restrictive covenant. In this case, defendant
started construction of a gas station on a lot limited to residential use.
Plaintiffs sought an injunction. To show that substantial changes had
occurred which were sufficient to deny enforcement of the restrictive
covenant, the defendant introduced evidence that many new stores and
business structures had been built on the street abutting the restricted
area, that the property was no longer suitable or desirable for residential
purposes, and that the removal of the restriction would not depreciate
the value of the plaintiff's property or lower the general class or character
of the neighborhood.
The trial court denied the relief prayed for and held that the changes
in the use to which the property in the neighborhood had been subjected
were of such a nature that it was oppressive and inequitable to give
effect to the restrictions. The case was affirmed on appeal to the California
Supreme Court.
A close analysis of the two cases will illustrate that in each the
decision was justified. The real question is whether the change in char-
acter of the property both within and without the tract is so substantial
that the property is no longer fit for the purpose for which the original
restrictions were imposed. The evidence in the Miles case demonstrated
that the property was still suitable for residential purposes, whereas in
the Downs case the evidence adduced showed that the property was no
longer suitable for residential use.
In Hurd v. Albert,5 it was shown that traffic within and without the
tract had increased and that the tract had become surrounded with
multiple dwellings. Injunctive relief to enforce the restrictive covenant
was denied. The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in the
Downs case stating:
The authorities unquestionably support the conclusion of the
trial court in holding that where there has been a change in the
uses to which the property in the neighborhood is being put, so
that such property is no longer residence property, it would be
unjust, oppressive, and inequitable to give effect to the restric-
tions, if such change has resulted from causes other than their
breach 6
One unique factor of the Hurd case was the urging by the plaintiff
that the defendants had acquired their property for the sole purpose of
breaking the restriction. The Court stated that this should not deprive
the defendants of consideration in a court of equity or require that the
injunction should be granted against them.
In Hess v. Country Club Park,7 the court again declined to give effect
5 214 Cal. 15, 3 P.2d 545 (1931).
6 Hurd v. Albert, supra note 5, 214 Cal. at 23, 3 P.2d at 548.
7 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931).
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to a restrictive covenant, holding that the property was no longer suitable
for residential purposes. Here the court considered as evidence that,
since the restrictions had been imposed, the street abutting the lot in
question had been widened from fifty to eighty feet; that by virtue of
a city ordinance the lot may only be used for certain businesses; and
that there were fourteen lots left within the tract which were still unsold,
and that three lots had been sold without any restrictions whatsoever.
The Hess case was followed in Marra u. Aetna."
Robertson v. NicholsO was a suit to quiet title and for declaratory
relief to set aside restrictions to single family dwellings. It was alleged
that the restrictions were ineffective because of changed conditions. The
streets located within the tract and adjacent to it had become congested;
there had been a change in the use of the property located within the
tract due to the construction of garage buildings, apartment houses and
stores; the property had been rezoned for multiple dwellings; the area
located outside the tract was built up with apartment houses and stores;
and the lots were worth $2,500 for homes; but $7,000 for apartment
houses.
The court held that although the land had become more valuable for
other than single family residences due to the location of the plaintiff's
property and the westward growth of the city, nevertheless, the property
of the plaintiffs and defendants was still suitable and desirable for single
family residential purposes in accordance with the restrictions. One of
the factors which the court used to reach its decision was the fact that the
lots in question were located in the heart of the tractwhere construction
of an apartment would definitely serve to damage the defendants without
injuring the plaintiffs. Had the lots in question bordered an unrestricted
area the outcome of the case might have been different.
The most recent California Supreme Court view upon the subject of
changed conditions was the decision in Wolff v. Fallon.1o Here, the or-
iginal deeds restricted the property to single-family dwellings. Plaintiff's
lot was within an area subsequently zoned commercial. On the block where
the plaintiff's lot was located were nineteen buildings of which sixteen
were stores and three were residences. The Court denied enforcement
of the restrictive covenant, taking into account the following circum-
stances: there was increased traffic along the street bordering the re-
stricted area and the plaintiff's lot; the value of the lot was $15,000
commercially, while for residential purposes it was worth only $4,000;
there were violations of the covenants within the tract itself; the plaintiff's
8 15 Cal.2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
9 92 Cal.App.2d 201, 206 P.2d 898 (1949). See also, Rice v. Heggy, 158 Cal.App.2d
89, 322 P.2d 53 (1958).
10 44 Cal.2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955).
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lot had been zoned by ordinance as a part of the commercial district;
and the lot was no longer suitable for residence purposes.
An excellent dissent by Justice Spence indicates the problem with
which the court is faced in a case of this type.
It seems clear that a line must be drawn somewhere dividing
residential and commercial development in any tract where both
are to be permitted. It seems clear that the residential lots which
are contiguous to commercial lots will necessarily be some what
less valuable. This situation is inherent in any plan of restrictive
covenants to provide orderly development; and it cannot justify
the lifting of restrictions on such contiguous lots unless the plan
itself is destroyed.1
In the light of the facts, it would appear that the original plan of the
first grantor had been destroyed despite the dissent. There was an en-
croachment within the tract itself, and the plaintiff's lot was no longer
suitable for the purpose for which the original restriction was imposed.
The latest case in this area of changed conditions is that of Hirsh v.
Hancock.12 This was an action to remose restrictions limiting the property
in question to single-family residential use. The lots were located on or
near Wilshire Boulevard. Among the changes that had occurred on
Wilshire since the restrictions had been imposed were that it had become
one of the most heavily traveled thoroughfares in Los Angeles, and, as
a result, dust and noise developed from the traffic: stop lights and
newshawkers were on almost every corner; the area had been zoned
commercial on both sides of the street; and that the taxes on the plaintiffs
were disproportionate to the use to which their property could be put.
The trial judge, who was sustained on appeal, found for the plaintiffs
and held that there had been such a change in the vicinity that the lots
were entirely unsuitable and undesirable for residential use; that the lots
had no present economic value except for business or commercial purposes;
and that enforcement of the restrictions would be burdensome, oppressive,
and inequitable to the plaintiffs and of no substantial benefit to the owners
of the other lots in the tract.
This case again affirmed the principle that the most important factor
which the court considers, to determine whether there has been such a
change so as to deny enforcement of a restrictive covenant, is that of
whether the property involved is suitable to the purpose for which the
restrictions were imposed.
Since 1959, changed conditions cases have reached a standstill. What
impresses one most about these cases is the fact that there is no absolute
rule which can be looked to for a determination. The courts must con-
sider all the circumstances of the case and render a decision based on
the evidence presented by the parties. Since these decisions are dependent
I ld. at 699, 284 P.2d at 805.
12 173 Cal.App.2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1949).
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